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Abstract
We begin by drawing attention to some drawbacks of what we shall call
the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this we contrast the def-
inition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano in hisWissenschaftslehre.
If Bolzano’s definition is viewed, as Bolzano himself almost certainly did
not view it, as attempting to capture the notion of analyticity as truth-
in-virtue-of-meaning which occupied centre stage during the first half of
the last century and which, Quine’s influential assault on it notwithstand-
ing, continues to attract philosophical attention, it runs into some very
serious problems. We argue that Bolzano’s central idea can, neverthe-
less, be used as the basis of a new definition which avoids these problems
and possesses definite advantages over the Frege-Quine approach. Our
title notwithstanding, we make no claim to contribute to the exegesis of
Bolzano’s thought and works, which we must leave to those more expert
in these matters than we are. Naturally, we have done our best not to
misrepresent Bolzano’s views, and believe we have avoided doing so. But
it bears emphasis that it is no part of our intention to suggest that the
modifications to his definition which we propose would have had any ap-
peal for him, or that he had, or would have had, any sympathy with the
project which motivates them.
1 Frege’s definition
A noteworthy feature of Frege’s explanation of the distinction between analytic
and synthetic judgements is that he views the distinction as an epistemological
one, in parallel with the obviously epistemological distinction between a priori
and a posteriori judgements:
Now these distinctions between a priori and a posteriori, syn-
thetic and analytic, concern . . . not the content of the judgement
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but the justification for making the judgement.. . .When a proposi-
tion is called a posteriori or analytic, in my sense, this is not a judge-
ment about the conditions, psychological, physiological and physical,
which have made it possible to form the content of the proposition
in our consciousness; nor is it a judgement about the way in which
some other man has come, perhaps erroneously, to believe it true;
rather, it is a judgement about the ultimate ground upon which rests
the justification for holding it to be true.([Frege(1884)], §3)
Clearly Frege’s main concern here is to distance himself from any sort of psy-
chological account of the distinctions he is about to explain, and from any sug-
gestion that they relate to different ways in which judgements are to be causally
explained. But it is worth emphasizing that in holding that the distinctions
concern justification, he is also distancing himself from, or at least avoiding
commitment to, any view on which the distinctions concern the grounds of
truth – what makes the judgement true – in the way that is suggested by,
for example, subsequent characterizations of analyticity in terms of ‘truth-in-
virtue-of-meaning’. We shall return to this point, and its significance, much
later. Frege continues:
This means that the question is removed from the sphere of psy-
chology, and assigned, if the truth concerned is a mathematical one,
to the sphere of mathematics. It now becomes a problem of finding
the proof of the proposition, and of following it back to the primitive
truths. If in the course of doing so, we come only only general logical
laws and definitions, then the truth is an analytic one, bearing in
mind that we must take account also of any propositions on which
the admissibility of any definition depends.
Thus according to Frege, a judgement is analytic iff the proposition judged true
can be proved from using only general logical laws, together with definitions.
There is an obvious similarity between Frege’s definition and Quine’s sub-
sequent characterization of what he terms the ‘second class’ of statements gen-
erally held to be analytic. The ‘first class’ of such statements are those, such
as ‘No unmarried man is married’, which, he says, ‘may be called logically true,
where a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all
reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles’. But, he
continues
. . . there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified
by:
(2) No bachelor is married
The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned
into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms.([Quine(1953)]pp.22-
3)
We might, then, define:
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A statement S is broadly analytic iff (i) S is logically true, or (ii)
for some logically true statement S*, S is transformable into S* by
substituting synonymous expressions
Statements which qualify as broadly analytic by clause (i) may be said to be
narrowly analytic. Although, for reasons too well-known to require restatement
here, Quine himself does not regard this as an acceptable definition, no harm
need result from labelling it as the Frege-Quine definition (of broad analyticity).
The Frege-Quine definition has two notable drawbacks. The first concerns
logical truths. Such truths compose the base class in terms of which the re-
mainder of the class of broadly analytic truths is defined. But while it is clear
that statements in the remainder are supposed to count as analytic because re-
ducible to logical truths, the status of logical truths themselves as analytic is left
entirely without explanation. The point is not that the choice of logical truths
to compose the base class is arbitrary – just about anyone who has any use for
the notion of analyticity would classify them as analytic. And everyone would
agree that it would be absurd to take instead, say, the laws of thermodynam-
ics, or the truths recorded in Mrs. Beaton’s Manual of Cookery and Household
Management, as the base class. The point is just that the definition gives no
hint why logical truths should themselves be regarded as analytic.1
A second drawback concerns the extensional correctness of the definition. If
we think of it, not as a straightforward stipulation, but as intended to codify
an already accepted notion, then it seems clearly to fail. For there appears to
be a significant class of statements which those who think they understand the
notion would wish to see classified as ‘true-purely-in-virtue-of-meaning’, so as
analytic in the intended spirit of the notion, whose members are neither logical
truths nor reducible to logical truths by substitution of synonyms for synonyms.
Well known candidates are such statements as ‘Anything red is coloured’, ‘If one
event precedes another, and the second precedes a third, then the first precedes
the third’ – the reader will surely be able to think of many others. Perhaps
some candidates are more controversial than others – witness ‘Nothing can be
red and green all over’ – but that there is a substantial class of statements which
fall under the intuitive extension of ‘analytic’, yet elude classification as analytic
by the Frege-Quine definition because they essentially involve terms which do
not admit of the definitional paraphrases which would permit their reduction to
logical truths, seems beyond serious question.2
1We are not suggesting that this drawback is one which Quine would, or should, have
worried about. It is a drawback only for someone who is trying, as Quine was not, to give an
acceptable definition which does not merely circumscribe the extension of the term ‘analytic’
but captures the essence of the concept. Quine thought there was no essence to capture, and
was merely trying to characterize, for critical purposes, the class of statements commonly
taken to be analytic. Whether he should have been worried by the second shortcoming to
which we draw attention is another question entirely.
2The second of these drawbacks, and something close to the first, are pointed out by Paul
Boghossian in a couple of places (see [Boghossian(1997)], pp.338-9, [Boghossian(1996)], p.368).
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2 Bolzano’s definition
In hisWissenschaftslehre[Bolzano(1837)], volume II, section 148, Bernard Bolzano
gives a definition of analytic propositions which holds out some promise of ad-
dressing the last point. His definition of what he calls narrowly or logically
analytic propositions is of some historical interest, because it anticipates by
about 100 years the definition of logical truth given by Quine mentioned above.3
Bolzano takes being true and being false, being analytic and being synthetic to
be properties, in the primary sense, of what he calls propositions in themselves
[Sätze an sich], which he distinguishes both from verbal and mental propositions.
He takes propositions to be structured entities composed of ideas or concepts.
In this chapter, he considers the effects of varying some of the ideas that make
up a proposition, whilst keeping the other ideas involved in it fixed. What he
means by varying an idea here is replacing it uniformly throughout a propo-
sition by another idea. He notices that some propositions are such that if we
keep only the logical ideas or concepts occurring in them fixed, we may vary
any of the remaining ideas without changing the truth-value of the proposition.4
It is these propositions which he defines to be logically analytic, or analytic in
the narrower sense. Schematic examples he actually gives are: ‘A is A’, ‘An A
which is a B is an A’, ‘An A which is a B is a B’, and ‘Every object is either B
or non-B’.
If we say, in accordance with a well-established terminology, that an ex-
pression occurs essentially in a statement if and only if uniformly replacing it
throughout that statement may result in a statement that differs in truth-value
from the original one, and give a parallel explanation of an idea’s occurring
essentially in a proposition, then we can see that Bolzano’s definition of logi-
cal analyticity is virtually the same as Quine’s definition of logical truth: for
Bolzano, a proposition is logically analytically true if and only if it is true and
only logical ideas or concepts occur in it essentially; while for Quine, a statement
is logically true iff it is true and contains only logical expressions essentially. The
interest of Bolzano’s definition is not, however, confined to its being a forerun-
ner of Quine’s. Like Quine, Bolzano makes a distinction between broader and
narrower analytic truths. But whereas for Quine the broader notion is to be
explained, if it can be explained at all, on the basis of the narrower one, Bolzano
3As Quine acknowledges – see [Quine(1966)], fn.2, p.103. In saying the Bolzano’s definition
anticipates Quine’s, we are claiming only that the central idea of Quine’s definition is already
present in Bolzano’s, not that the two are equivalent. They are not. Most importantly, Quine’s
has the unfortunate consequence that such sentences as ∃x∃yx 6= y qualify as logical truths,
whereas thay are not logically analytic by Bolzano’s.
4More precisely, the result of varying these ideas will be a proposition having the same
truth-value, if it has denotation at all. By saying that an idea is denotative, Bolzano means
that it ‘has an object falling under it’ (see [Berg(1973)], p.82. Bolzano’s word is gegen-
ständlich). In the case of propositions, the result of substituting of one idea for another may
be a proposition which fails to have the same truth-value because it lacks denotation alto-
gether. Bolzano gives the example ‘The man Caius is mortal’, telling us that while every
replacement for the idea of Caius must yield a true proposition if it yields a proposition with
denotation at all, it may be that an idea is substituted – such as the idea of a rose or a triangle
– which results in a proposition lacking denotation altogether. See [Berg(1973)], pp.188-9)
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reverses the direction of explanation – for him, it is the broader notion which
is basic, and logically or narrowly analytic truth is merely a special case of
it.5 To understand how this comes about, we need to look more closely at his
explanation.
Bolzano’s general concern (see especially §147) is with the effects of vary-
ing one or other of the ideas in a proposition on its truth-value. Let p be any
proposition, and let i1, . . . , in be the ideas of which it is composed. Take one of
these ideas, ik. Then in general, some of the results of varying ik by putting an-
other idea in its place will be true propositions, and some will be false. Roughly
speaking, Bolzano defines the degree of validity6of p with respect to ik to be
the ratio of true propositions that result from varying ik to the total number of
propositions that are obtainable by varying ik. In the limiting case when every
proposition that so results is true – so that the validity of p with respect to ik
= 1 – Bolzano says that the proposition is universally valid with respect to ik
(or universally invalid, if every resulting proposition is false). We could express
this by saying that the idea ik occurs inessentially in p. Bolzano then, in effect,
defines a proposition to be analytic, in his broad sense, if it contains at least
one idea inessentially.
This proposal contrasts with Frege’s, and with the Frege-Quine definition,
in several respects.
First, whereas Frege and Frege-Quine seek to define analytic truth, Bolzano’s
definiens is analyticity – i.e. analytic truth-or-falsehood. For him, analytically
true and analytically false propositions are simply propositions which are both
analytic and true, or analytic and false, respectively. This, as we shall see in due
course, is a source of some difficulty; but for now, we simply note the point.7
Second, the definitions diverge over the bearers of analyticity. For Frege,
analyticity is a property of judgements, and for Frege-Quine, of statements,
while for Bolzano, it is a property of propositions-in-themselves. This difference
may be of some significance for the detailed exegesis of Bolzano’s own view,
but that is not our business here. It is straightforward enough to transpose
Bolzano’s definition so as to apply to statements, and while we shall respect
his usage when reporting or commenting on his actual views, we shall switch,
without special notice, to taking statements as the bearers of analyticity, when
5It is, of course, no accident that Quine privileges the narrow notion. For he believes that
while the broader notion cannot be satisfactorily explained, because an explanation requires
appeal to the problematic notion of synonymy, or some equally problematic alternative, the
narrow notion can be explained, drawing only upon the unproblematic notions of truth and
uniform substitution. Whether he is right so to believe is not our concern here. For an early
statement of the case against, see [Strawson(1957)]
6Bolzano’s term isGültigkeit, which Rolf George [George(1972)] translates as ‘satisfiability’;
Jan Berg’s translation ([Berg(1973)], p.187) has ‘validity’; ‘degree of validity’, which seems to
us more accurate, was suggested by Wolfgang Künne. Our formulation omits some restrictions
Bolzano introduces, but which do not affect our discussion.
7Curiously, Bolzano’s examples of logically analytic propositions are all examples of true
propositions; but he does give as examples of analytic propositions some which he clearly takes
to be false. See e.g. [Berg(1973)], p.192, where he cites ‘A morally evil man nevertheless enjoys
eternal happiness’ as an analytic proposition which remains false under any substitution for
the idea of man.
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we come to consider modifications of his definition.
There is a third, far more important point of contrast, at least between
Bolzano’s definition and Frege’s: while, as we have noted, Frege takes being an-
alytic, like being a priori or a posteriori, to be fundamentally an epistemological
notion, there is no whiff of epistemology in Bolzano’s account of it. His concern
is simply with the effects of varying certain of the ideas composing a proposition
upon its truth-value. Once again, this is a point to which we shall return in the
sequel.
3 Potential advantages of Bolzano’s definition
Well and good. The question arising now is what, if any, may be the advantages
of Bolzano’s definition over that of Frege-Quine.8 One apparent such advantage
may speedily be seen to be illusory. It is clear that logically analytic propositions
are, for Bolzano, a special case of analytic propositions in his broader sense. For
logically analytic truths will be true propositions in which all but logical ideas
occur inessentially. It may now appear that the primary advantage of Bolzano’s
definition is that it captures a broader notion of analytic truth, corresponding to
Quine’s second class, whilst deploying only the relatively modest resources – viz.
the notions of truth and uniform substitution – which Quine thinks sufficient
to characterize the narrower class of logical truths. It may thus appear that
Bolzano provides a way of bypassing the difficulties Quine raises about the
explanation of the broader notion – that he succeeds in defining it without
reliance upon the notion of synonymy or any of the other notions Quine regards
as equally suspect. It is important to see that this apparent advantage is merely
apparent.
The reason why this is so becomes clear as soon as we ask whether the
proposition expressed by, for example, ‘Vixens are female’ qualifies as (broadly)
analytic in Bolzano’s sense. At first sight, it fails to do so, since – to put the
difficulty in Bolzano’s terminology – it appears to contain no idea that can be
varied at will without variation in truth-value. If the written proposition is
assumed accurately to reflect the composition out of ideas of the proposition in
itself that the sentence ‘Vixens are female’ expresses, then that proposition must
be reckoned synthetic in Bolzano’s sense; for it will contain no idea inessentially.
And so it will be with indefinitely many further examples of propositions which
would be classified as analytic, at least by anyone who has any use for the
(broader) notion at all.
Of course, Bolzano would regard the proposition expressed by ‘Vixens are
female’ as analytic, even though it appears at first to fail to qualify as such by
8Our focus here is entirely on the potential advantages of Bolzano’s definition, when it
is viewed as an alternative to the more familiar Frege-Quine definition. As we say in our
abstract, we make no claim concerning what may have been Bolzano’s own purposes in defining
analyticity, what role his definition may have been intended to play in his overall philosophy, or
what relation he may have taken it to bear to Kant’s definition(s). For interesting discussions
of these and other questions about Bolzano’s actual views, see [Künne(2008a)], reprinted in
[Künne(2008b)], which contains several other relevant papers, and [Lapointe(2011)], chs. 4,5
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his definition. In a note on his definition, he says:
In order to determine whether a proposition which is given a cer-
tain linguistic expression is analytic or synthetic, more is required
than a cursory inspection of its words. A proposition may be ana-
lytic, perhaps logically analytic, or even identical, though its literal
phrasing does not make this immediately apparent. . . . Thus it may
not be immediately obvious that the proposition ‘Every effect has a
cause’ is in fact identical, or at any rate analytic; for by ‘effect’ we
always mean something which is brought about by something else,
and the phrase ‘to have a cause’ means as much as ‘to be brought
about by something else’; thus the above proposition merely means
‘Whatever is brought about by something else is brought about by
something else’9
If we say, as Bolzano would presumably have been happy to say, that a spoken
proposition is analytic if the proposition-in-itself expressed by it is so, then the
point he is making here could be put by saying that the proposition-in-itself
(see page 4) that is expressed by a given spoken proposition is that proposition-
in-itself that results from the given spoken proposition by fully expanding it
accordance with definitions of its ingredient words. But this means, of course,
that to justify the acknowledgement of the proposition expressed by ‘Vixens are
female’ as analytic, Bolzano has after all to rely upon claims about synonymy,
and so has not after all provided a way of explaining broad analyticity that both
gives it the intuitively correct extension and bypasses Quine’s objections to the
notion.10
A genuine advantage of Bolzano’s definition, assuming it to be acceptable,
lies elsewhere – in its greater generality. Specifically, it promises to accommodate
as analytic examples of the ‘third kind’ which fail to be so classified by the Frege-
Quine definition. Putative examples, again, are:
If Mozart’s stockings are yellow, then they are coloured
If Vivaldi’s birthday precedes Handel’s, and Handel’s precedes
Bach’s, then Vivaldi’s precedes Bach’s
For in these propositions, the ideas of Mozart’s stockings, and Vivaldi’s, Handel’s
and Bach’s birthdays all occur inessentially. And with a small refinement of
Bolzano’s definition, we can ensure that the more general propositions such as:
Anything yellow is coloured
If one event precedes a second, and the second precedes a third,
the first precedes the third
9[Bolzano(1837)], §148. By an ‘identical’ proposition Bolzano means an instance of the Law
of Identity ‘A is A’. A quite different explanation how Bolzano can count the propositions
expressed by ‘No bachelor is married’ and ‘Vixens are female’ as analytic is suggested by
Lapointe (see [Lapointe(2011)], pp.64-6). We see no good reason not to adopt the simpler one
suggested in the this passage.
10The point we have been emphasizing is made very clearly by Wolfgang Künne (see
[Künne(2008a)], pp.298-300)
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also qualify. Of course, they do not qualify on his definition as it is, because
neither contains any idea inessentially. But it would not be unreasonable to
claim that a generalization is analytic iff all its instances are, and to modify the
definition accordingly. Under the modified definition, these and similar general
statements would qualify. Thus Bolzano’s definition together with our modest
emendation appears to have the very desirable consequence that just the kind
of true statement which we previously claimed ought to count as analytic –
but fails to do so on the Frege-Quine definition – gets correctly classified. So
although Bolzano’s definition does not dispense with reliance on the notion of
synonymy, it does allow us to recognize as analytic many statements which are
not reducible to logical truths by synonymous substitution.
Further, there is at least some progress with the other drawback of the Frege-
Quine definition – the unexplained status of logical truths as analytic. For since,
on Bolzano’s definition, logically analytic propositions are just a special case of
analytic propositions in general, there is no special problem about explaining
why they are analytic. But only partial progress – for obviously, assuming
the definition to be otherwise in good standing, there would still be a good
question why it should be thought to capture whatever intuitive idea informs
our application of the notion of analyticity. But before pursuing that question,
we should face up to the fact that the definition is open to a seemingly fatal line
of objection.11
4 Over-extension (1)
We have taken one of the advantages of Bolzano’s definition to consist in its
capturing a broader range of analytic truths than the Frege-Quine definition.
But if the objection we are going to consider is sound, the definition is too broad
– because it has the consequence that many propositions are to be reckoned
analytically true that are not so, but are very plainly at best statements of
contingent empirical fact.
Consider any contingently true generalization – this can be either some true
statement of natural law, or equally some true accidental generalization. For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, we may suppose it to have the form:
∀x(Fx → Gx). Now consider any one of its instances: Fa → Ga. Then
under the supposition we are making, this statement is not merely true, but
remains so under any uniform substitution on a. Accordingly, whilst the parent
generalization no doubt comes out as synthetic under Bolzano’s definition –
there being, we may assume, (uniform) substitutions on F or G (or both) which
yield a falsehood – the instance qualifies as analytic. Thus it is true – though
11The objection we are about to consider is, of course, an objection to the definition when
it is viewed as attempting to capture the notion at which Frege-Quine is aimed – a notion on
which analytically true propositions will be invariably necessary and knowable a priori. This
perspective is assumed for the remainder of the paper, and in particular, by our claims about
the potential advantages of Bolzano’s definition and of the modifications of it we consider.
Whether the Kneales’ and the other main problem we consider are problems for Bolzano’s
own project is not our concern here. See also note 15 below.
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presumably not in consequence of any natural law – that no eighteenth century
philosopher died on the anniversary of his birth. Thus whatever substitution is
made for ‘Kant’ in ‘Kant was not an eighteenth century philosopher who died
on the anniversary of his birth’, a true statement results. Hence our proposition
about Kant must be reckoned analytically true, on Bolzano’s account.
This objection, noted by William and Martha Kneale12, appears quite dev-
astating – for it appears that the very feature of Bolzano’s definition in virtue
of which it promises to capture a wider notion than either that of narrow or
logical analyticity (i.e. logical truth, as defined by Quine) or broad analyticity
as explained in terms of reducibility to logical truth via definitional expansion,
is precisely what is responsible for the disaster.13 If we view Bolzano’s definition
as an attempt to generalize Quine’s definition of logical truth, the generaliza-
tion amounts to this: whereas Quine requires for a statement to be logically
true that all the non-logical expressions occurring in it should do so inessen-
tially, Bolzano requires (for a statement to be analytic) only that some of the
non-logical expressions occurring in it should do so. But in any instance of a
true general statement, the singular terms will occur inessentially, so that any
such statement will count as analytic. The resulting unwanted expansion of the
class of analytic truths thus appears as the inevitable, and clearly unacceptable,
price of seeking to define a broader notion in terms of the incapacity of uniform
substitution to change truth value.
Is there any way to meet this difficulty? Can we find a revision of Bolzano’s
definition which retains its advantages whilst avoiding this consequence?
12See [Kneale(1962)], p.366-7; the Kneales are also responsible for the nice example. They
clearly assume the perspective on Bolzano’s definition described in the note 12. A kind
of obverse of their example may be got by considering false existential generalizations: if
∃xA(x) is false, then a will occur inessentially in A(a), so that each and every instance of
the generalization will count as analytic in Bolzano’s sense, regardless of the status of the
parent existential generalization. Clearly there will be further anomalies. Thus consider and
statement ∀x(Fx∨(¬Fx∧p)), where p is some contingent truth. Any instance Fa∨(¬Fa∧p)
will rank as analytic. Of course, were p false rather than true, a might well fail to occur
inessentially, since Fa might be true but Fb false. a’s inessential occurrence is contingent on
the truth-value of p. This – contingently inessential occurrence – is what the Kneales’ and
similar examples exploit.
13It appears so, but is it so? In fact, an analogue, or at least a close relative, of the
Kneales’ problem aﬄicts Quine’s definition of logical truth itself, independently of Bolzano’s
generalization. As is well-known, for any natural number n we can express that there exist at
least n objects in the language of first-order quantification theory with identity, for example by
writing ∀x∃n−1y y 6= x (where ∃nx, meaning ‘There are at least n x’, is recursively definable in
the usual way). A nominalist who thinks that there are only concrete objects, but that there
are at least 17 of them, will take ∀x∃16y y 6= x to be true, but it is surely not a logical truth.
Further, each of its instances ∃16y y 6= a will contain a inessentially, and so will qualify as a
logical truth by Quine’s definition, just as it qualifies as logically analytic under Bolzano’s.
To be sure, a philosopher of a very different persuasion (but probably not Quine!) might
argue that these are no contingent, empirical truths, but are necessary. But that brings no
respite, since it leaves untouched the central point, which is that they are surely not logically
necessary or logically true – so that Quine’s definition, and hence the Frege-Quine definition
of analyticity which rests upon it, is in as bad a shape as Bolzano’s.
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5 Blind alleys
5.1 A two-part definition?
Whilst Bolzano’s definition misclassifies as analytically true any instance of a
synthetically true generalization, it appears to yield the right verdict when ap-
plied to the parent generalization itself. Thus there is, for example, no idea
for which we may freely substitute any other idea in the proposition expressed
by ‘No eighteenth century philosopher died on his birthday’. More generally,
Bolzano’s definition appears to yield intuitively correct results when its applica-
tion is restricted to propositions expressed by sentences devoid of singular terms.
Thus it may seem that we could secure a base class of analytic propositions,
avoiding the Kneales’ objection, by restricting the application of Bolzano’s def-
inition to statements free of singular terms. We might then, it seems, take care
the remaining ‘good’ candidates, including analytic propositions whose expres-
sion involves the use of singular terms, by adding that a statement is analytically
true if it is deducible from some statement(s) belonging to the base class. In
short, the proposal is for two part definition:
(1) A purely general statement is analytically true if it is true
and contains at least one expression inessentially
(2) Any statement is analytically true if it is a logical consequence
of some statement(s) analytically true by (1)
This proposal makes the status as analytically true of statements involving ref-
erence to particular objects derivative from that of analytic general statements,
and so goes flat against our earlier proposal to secure the analyticity of state-
ments like ‘Whatever is yellow is coloured’ (analyticities of the third kind) by
taking a generalization to be analytic iff all its instances are. But since we have
not shown that that is the only way to accommodate analyticities of the third
kind, the present proposal remains, so far, a live option, and it is therefore worth
considering whether, should it prove possible to accommodate analyticities of
the third kind in some other way, it would be a viable option.
It would not be fair to object that the proposal is merely ad hoc. There is
a well-established tradition of thought which has it that necessary truth has its
source in relations among general concepts. The treatment of singular state-
ments as analytic only when they are logically derivable from analytic general
statements might be seen as a reflection of what is right in that admittedly
somewhat sketchy thought.
It might also be objected that the proposal makes an unexplained use of the
notion of logical consequence, and that when this is explained, the definition will
turn out to be viciously circular. As against this, we may note that if this were
a good objection, it would tell equally against the Frege-Quine definition. But
in fact, it is unclear that an explanation of logical consequence need involve any
appeal to the notion of analyticity. Standard explanations, to be sure, invoke
the notion of necessary truth-preservation, or logical necessity, but neither is
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usually explained in terms of analyticity, and there is no compelling reason to
think they must be. There is, however, a more serious objection.
Even if we can exclude counterexamples to the original definition by the
emendation proposed, this does not dispose of the problem, because we can
reduplicate the difficulty at the next level up. That is, just as we obtain counter-
examples to Bolzano’s original definition by exploiting synthetically true first-
level generalizations to locate statements featuring singular terms that ought
not to be, but are, counted as analytic by Bolzano’s definition, so we can find
synthetically true second -level generalizations whose truth ensures that uniform
replacement of first-level predicates will not alter truth value – with the result
that certain first-level generalizations that instantiate them rank as analytic
under our revised definition, when they ought to come out as synthetic.
In fact, we can give an effective procedure for generating such higher-level
counter-examples. We may assume that there are some merely synthetically true
first-level generalizations. Let ∀xQx be any such. Then the first-level predicate
Qx is true of every object. But then the second-level generalization ∀F∀x(Fx→
Qx) is likewise synthetically true. Take any instance, say ∀x(Px→ Qx). Then
this will rank as analytic by clause (1) – for however we vary P , the resulting
statement will be true, just because ∀F∀x(Fx→ Qx) is.
5.2 Necessitated inessentiality?
It may be suggested that once we see why Bolzano’s original definition is vul-
nerable to the kind of counter-examples we have discussed, it is not too difficult
to see how his definition needs to be modified so as to exclude them. We can
reformulate Bolzano’s original definition in this way:
S is analytic iff there is an expression u occurring in S such that
where v is any other expression of the same grammatical type as u,
the statement that results from S by substituting v for u throughout
S is materially equivalent to S
or more concisely:
S is analytic iff ∃u(u occurs inS ∧ ∀v(S[uv ]↔ S))
The present problem is that whenever S is an instance of some contingently
true general statement, not only S, but also every other instance of that general
statement will be true, as it happens, with the result that however we vary the
names or singular terms occurring in S, the resulting statements will always be
alike in truth-value with S. So S will count as analytic. If, on the other hand,
S is an instance of a contingently false general statement, S will not count as
analytic, even if it happens to be true, because there will be some other instance
of the general statement which is false, and so some singular term that can be
substituted for a singular term occurring in S to yield a statement different in
truth-value from S. Clearly, however, whether a statement is or is not analytic
ought not to depend in this way on what merely happens to be the case. What
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determines whether or not S is analytic should be not whether substitutions
of the kind in question do as a matter of fact lead to a change in truth-value,
but whether or not they could do so. This suggests that we should strengthen
Bolzano’s definition in the following way :
S is analytic iff ∃u(u occurs inS ∧∀v(S[uv ]↔ S))
This small adjustment clearly suffices to block unwanted candidates such as in-
stances of true, but only contingently true, generalizations, since while the par-
ent generalization’s truth ensures that uniform substitution on singular terms
will preserve truth-value, its contingency means that it need not do so. Of
course, anyone who sympathizes with Quine’s scepticism about the intelligibil-
ity of intensional idioms (such as the necessity operator) as opposed to sup-
posedly purely extensional ones (such as truth and uniform substitution) will
find this strengthening unacceptable. But we have already seen that the hope
that Bolzano’s approach would enable us to give an account of analytic truth
in purely extensional terms is doomed to frustration. So we may set aside that
objection here. There is, however, a much more serious problem.
Consider the proposition:
If this ring is pure gold, it is entirely composed of a substance
whose atomic number is 79
We may substitute any singular term we wish for the italicized words and the
resulting proposition not only will, but must, be true – assuming, as we certainly
may, that the generalization of which we have taken an instance is not only true,
but true as a matter of metaphysical necessity. But while the generalization, and
so each of its instances, is metaphysically necessary, none of these propositions is
analytically true. In short, the proposed emendation, as it stands, precipitates a
collapse of the distinction between metaphysical necessity and analyticity. The
trouble lies with the unqualified or indiscriminate use of the necessity operator.
In order to get the extensionally correct result, we would need somehow to
specify that  is to express the right kind of necessity – one grounded purely in
senses, or concepts – and it is quite unclear how we could do so without using
the very notion we are trying to explain.
6 Over-extension (2) – the embedding problem
We should now take note of a further serious problem with Bolzano’s original
definition, when it is viewed as an attempt to capture the traditional conception
of analyticity as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning and as a potential improvement on
the Frege-Quine definition. Let p be any proposition which qualifies as ana-
lytic by Bolzano’s definition in virtue of containing the idea i inessentially, and
consider its conjunction with q, where q is any intuitively synthetic proposition
having the same truth-value as p, but not containing the idea i at all.14 By
14The point of the restriction is that if q contains i, then uniform replacement of i throughout
p ∧ q by another idea i′ may result in a proposition p ∧ q′ which differs in truth-value from
p ∧ q, just because i does not occur inessentially in q.
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hypothesis, p contains at least one idea which may be varied at will without
yielding a proposition differing in truth-value from p. But then clearly the same
must go for p∧q, given that q and p are alike in truth-value, and that i does not
occur in q, so that varying i does not disturb q’s truth-value. Then p ∧ q will
likewise qualify as analytic. Yet it clearly should not do so. It is true enough
that if p is analytically false, so will be any conjunction of which it is a conjunct,
so that Bolzano’s definition gives the right result here. But suppose instead that
p is true, and so analytically true according to the obvious way of defining an-
alytic truth in Bolzano’s terms. If q is true but synthetic, it seems clear that
their conjunction should count as at best synthetically true. (cf. ‘Married men
are men and Handel outlived Bach’).15
Essentially the same problem arises over disjunction. Let p be analytic, with
i occurring inessentially, and let q be synthetic, materially equivalent to p, and
i-free. Then p ∨ q will likewise be analytic. The problem, this time, arises
when p is analytically false. Similar difficulties will arise with other embeddings
of any proposition that is analytic by Bolzano’s lights. In general terms, the
problem is that if a statement A is analytic by Bolzano’s definition, so will be
any statement B which incorporates A, provided that the expressions in A in
virtue of which it qualifies as analytic do not occur in B other than as parts of
A, and A does not occur within a referentially opaque context in B.
It is easy to see that this embedding problem applies equally to each of our
two attempts to rescue Bolzano’s definition from the Kneales’ objection. For if
containing at least one idea inessentially is a sufficient condition for analyticity,
as on the first proposal, then any conjunction one of whose conjuncts is analytic
must be so also. And requiring, as on the second proposal, that uniform re-
placement of at least one idea should necessarily leave truth-value undisturbed
equally clearly does nothing to alleviate the problem.
7 Post mortem – and a better proposal?
7.1 Epistemologizing Bolzano
Let’s take stock. We have at this point two outstanding objections to Bolzano’s
proposal: the first, due to the Kneales, allows of a response only at the cost
of the apparent circularity of invoking a notion of necessity in the explanans
which itself promises to require explanation in terms of analyticity; the second
15We should emphasize that we are not claiming that the problem is a problem for Bolzano,
given his own purposes in giving his definition. That it is a problem for Bolzano is suggested
by Jan Berg. Although Berg presents the problem as ‘an objection from a modern viewpoint’,
conceding that ‘Bolzano would probably not have considered [this] objection serious’, he thinks
it serious enough to add ‘At any rate, this consequence of [his definition of broad analytic-
ity] makes us concentrate our interest on the notion of logical analyticity’ (see [Berg(1962)],
p.101, also his editorial introductions to [Bolzano(1987)], p.18, and to [Berg(1973)], p.18).
We are grateful to Wolfgang Künne for the first two references. As Künne emphasizes (see
[Künne(2008a)], p.248ff, esp. fn.48), while it is true that under Bolzano’s definition, analytic
propositions may be contingent and knowable only by empirical investigation, it is by no
means clear that Bolzano would have found this consequence unwelcome or disturbing.
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– the embedding problem – seems to impose a disconnection between inessential
occurrence and analyticity prima facie fatal to Bolzano’s account.
Let us focus on the first of these difficulties. There is, as we have already
emphasized (see page 6), a major difference between Bolzano’s definition and
Frege’s: for Frege, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements,
in line with that between a priori and a posteriori, is an epistemological one –
the claim that a judgement is analytic is a claim about how it may be justified.
By contrast, Bolzano defines the analyticity of a proposition simply in terms of
the effect of varying some of its ingredient ideas upon its truth-value. But as the
Kneales’ objection brings out, inessential occurrence is no sure guide to analytic
status, for it may have its source in some background contingencies. An obvious
corollary is that the fact that an idea (or expression) occurs inessentially in a
proposition (or statement) may itself be something recognizable a posteriori,
via independent knowledge of the relevant contingencies. A further unwanted
consequence is thus that Bolzano’s definition threatens the traditional connec-
tion between analyticity and a priori knowability. In the light of all this, a
natural and plausible response to the first of our problems is to ‘epistemologize’
Bolzano’s definition : a proposition is logically analytic if it not only contains
at least one idea inessentially and only logical ideas essentially, but is such that
the fact that it does so can be recognized simply by relying upon one’s grasp
of those ideas or concepts involved in the proposition which cannot be varied
freely; and, generalizing this, a proposition is analytic if it not only contains at
least one idea inessentially, but is such that that fact can be recognized simply
by relying upon one’s grasp of those ideas or concepts involved in the proposition
which cannot be varied freely. 16
Accordingly, we may – as a first approximation – consider the following
definition:
E-Bolzano 1 A statement A is analytic iff (i) A contains at least one expres-
sion which can be freely varied without change of truth-value (ii)
16Interestingly, although his definition remains resolutely non-epistemological, Bolzano was
sensitive to the kind of connection on which the proposed revision focuses. Commenting on
his examples of logically analytic propositions (See page 4), Bolzano writes:
The examples of analytic propositions I have just cited are differentiated
. . . by the fact that nothing is necessary for judging the[ir] analytic nature . . .
besides logical knowledge, because the concepts that make up the invariant part
of these propositions all belong to logic. (Wissenschaftslehre §148, [Berg(1973)],
p.193)
What is especially interesting here is Bolzano’s saying that only logical knowledge is needed to
recognize the analytic nature (rather than, as one might expect, the truth) of such propositions
as those expressed by ‘A is A’, ‘An A which is B is an A’, etc. Recognizing the analytic nature
consists, in his view, in seeing that certain ideas involved in the proposition can be varied in
any way we please, and the result will be a proposition having the same truth-value as the
original. It is this idea that the epistemologized version of Bolzano’s definition we are about
to consider takes up and generalizes. We are not, of course, suggesting that Bolzano himself
harboured any thought that his original definition might be modified along these lines. On the
contrary, he is firmly opposed to the introduction of any kind of epistemological considerations
in defining analyticity. The non-epistemic character of Bolzano’s definition is emphasized by
Michael Dummett in [Dummett(1991)], pp.28-30
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that fact can be recognized by anyone who understands the remain-
ing, non-variable expressions composing A, and grasps the semantic
significance of its syntax17
This modified definition avoids the Kneales’ objection, and finesses the need to
modalize in response to it. The objection exploits empirical inessentiality – the
fact that an expression may indeed occur inessentially in a statement, but only
courtesy of that statement’s being an instance of some true empirical gener-
alization. Where a statement does contain an expression which can be varied
without change of truth value, but only because that statement is an instance
of a true empirical generalization, grasp of the remaining expressions composing
the statement precisely does not suffice to enable one to recognize that there
is an expression which can be varied without disturbing truth-value. To know
that, in such a case, one would need to know that the parent generalization
is true, and mastery of the expressions involved in the candidate statement,
though necessary, is insufficient for such knowledge.
However, while this modification escapes the Kneales’ objection and pre-
serves the principal potential advantage of Bolzano’s original definition – of
enabling us to see logical analyticity as a special case of a more general phe-
nomenon, thereby avoiding the necessity of viewing the analyticity of logically
true statements as a matter of direct stipulation, as on the Frege-Quine defi-
nition – it does nothing to alleviate the other major difficulty we found with
Bolzano’s original, viz. the embedding problem. Epistemologizing Bolzano’s
definition in the way indicated does not help. For if A is analytic in virtue of
containing an expression e which can be varied freely without altering the truth-
value of A, and B is any longer statement incorporating A but containing no
additional occurrences of e, anyone who understands B will be able to recognize
that it contains A as a part, and contains no additional occurrences of e, and
so will be able to recognize that B contains e inessentially.
7.2 The embedding problem solved
The embedding problem shows that even if Bolzano’s definition leads us to count
relatively simple statements as analytically true, or analytically false, just when
they would be so classified in accordance with the traditional conception, it is
liable to go badly astray when applied to more complex statements embedding
them. Why is this? An obvious thought is that the problem reflects an im-
portant discrepancy between analyticity in Bolzano’s sense and the traditional
conception associated with the notions of truth/falsehood-in-virtue-of-meaning.
The former is, as we might put it, upwards-hereditary, in the sense that the
result of incorporating a Bolzano-analytic statement as part of a more complex
17Here and subsequently we treat analyticity as a property of statements (interpreted sen-
tences), rather than propositions. When this is done, it is crucial to emphasize that the basis
on which inessential occurrence is to be recognizable includes not only understanding of the
statement’s remaining, non-variable expressions, but also grasp of its syntax. We have in-
cluded this last requirement here, but, in the interests of brevity, we will often leave it to be
understood in the sequel.
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statement must likewise be Bolzano-analytic, provided only that the remainder
of the containing statement is free of further occurrences of the expressions oc-
curring inessentially in the Bolzano-analytic part. But the traditional notion of
analyticity clearly lacks this property. To take the simplest and most obvious
examples, while the analytic falsehood of one conjunct suffices for that of the
conjunction as a whole, a conjunction is analytically true only if both conjuncts
are so; and while the analytic truth of one disjunct suffices for that of any dis-
junction incorporating it as a disjunct, a disjunction is analytically false only if
both disjuncts are.
This initial diagnosis suggests that we might solve the problem by giving
a recursive definition, using Bolzano-analyticity (or rather, our epistemologized
version of it) to characterize a suitable base class, and using the recursive clauses
to impose suitable requirements on the components of complex statements. Such
a recursive definition can indeed be given, and in an appendix, we illustrate how
this may be done for a first-order language. There is, however, another short-
coming which reflection on the embedding problem discloses, and this suggests
a rather different remedy, making no essential play with recursion.
As previously observed (see p.5), Bolzano’s definition of analytic proposi-
tions covers both analytically true and analytically false propositions, making
no distinction between them. By contrast, such a distinction is central to the tra-
ditional conception, which explains analytic truth as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning
and analytic falsehood as falsehood-in-virtue-of-meaning. Of course, one could
define notions of analytic truth and falsehood in terms of Bolzano’s notion of
analyticity together with the notions of truth and falsehood, and one could de-
fine a general notion of analytic proposition in terms of the traditional notions
of analytic truth and analytic falsehood. But there remains a crucial difference.
Starting from Bolzano’s definition, we obtain:
A is analytically true iff A is analytic and A is true, and A is
analytically false iff A is analytic and A is false
Starting from the traditional notions, we obtain:
A is analytic iff A is analytically true or A is analytically false
But the resultant notions of analytic truth and analytic falsehood under the first
definition are plainly not equivalent to analytic truth and analytic falsehood as
traditionally understood. Indeed, they are not even co-extensive, since
Haydn outlived Mozart and if Bartok and Kodaly were compa-
triots, Bartok and Kodaly were compatriots
counts as analytically true in Bolzano’s sense, whereas it is clearly not so ac-
cording to the traditional conception.
It is a consequence of precisely this divergence between Bolzano’s notion
and the traditional one that epistemologizing Bolzano’s definition, as suggested
in the preceding sub-section, does nothing to solve the embedding problem.
Recognizing that a statement is analytic in the sense that it contains at least
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one expression which may be varied without change of truth-value is consistent
with total ignorance of the statement’s truth-value. In particular, someone who
can recognize that the right conjunct in our last example is Bolzano-analytic is
in position to recognize that the whole conjunction is so. Of course, this ability
consists with total ignorance of the fact that the conjunction is, as it happens,
true; but that is of no matter, since knowledge of truth-value is not required for
knowledge of Bolzano-analyticity.
This suggests a quite different way of dealing with the embedding problem:
emend E-Bolzano 1 to deal separately with analytic truth and analytic false-
hood, and require recognition of truth-value as well as recognition of inessential
occurrence. This yields
E-Bolzano 2.1 A statement A is analytically true iff (i) A is true, (ii) A contains
at least one expression which can be freely varied without change of
truth-value, and (iii) that (i) and (ii) both hold can be recognized
by anyone who understands the remaining, non-variable expressions
composing A
E-Bolzano 2.2 A statement A is analytically false iff (i) A is false, (ii) A contains
at least one expression which can be freely varied without change of
truth-value, and (iii) that (i) and (ii) both hold can be recognized
by anyone who understands the remaining, non-variable expressions
composing A
Clearly, this adjustment is by itself enough to dispose of the embedding prob-
lem, without need for the complications of a recursive definition. Suppose, for
example, that A is analytically true (i.e. meets conditions (i)-(iii) above), and
consider its conjunction with any synthetic statement, B. Even if B is true, the
fact that it is, and hence the fact that A ∧ B is true, will not be recognizable
solely on the basis of competence with the remaining, essentially occurring, ex-
pressions in the conjunction. To be sure, should A be analytically false, then
anyone competent in the use of the relevant expressions will be able to recognize
that conditions (i)-(iii) are met with respect to its conjunction with any other
statement, so that the conjunction will qualify as analytically false – but that
is as it should be. Oppositely, A’s analytic truth will suffice for that of any
disjunction A ∨B, but rightly so; while should A be analytically false, this will
not suffice to force analytic falsehood on its disjunction with arbitrary B, for B
may well be true. Other sentential compounds likewise raise no problem.
It remains to modify the foregoing proposal to accommodate analyticities of
the third kind. These may be captured by modifying our definition in the way
previously envisaged with Bolzano’s own definition (See p.3). We propose:
E-Bolzano 3.1 A statement A is analytically true iff (a) (i) A is true, (ii) A
contains at least one expression which can be freely varied without
change of truth-value, and (iii) that (i) and (ii) both hold can be rec-
ognized by anyone who understands the remaining, non-variable ex-
pressions composing A, or (b) A is a universal generalization whose
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instances are all analytically true or an existential generalization at
least one of whose instances is so
with a similar adjustment for the definition of analytic falsehood.
8 Analytic knowledge, epistemic and ‘metaphys-
ical’ analyticity
8.1 An obvious complaint answered
The foregoing proposal is, however, open to a very immediate complaint18: that
the requirements that A be true (false) and that it should contain at least one
expression inessentially, feature within it as separate, so far quite unconnected
conditions. This was forced, given that – in contrast to Bolzano – we are distin-
guishing analytic truth and falsehood in our definitions. All the same, if any kind
of account of the nature of analyticity is to be attempted, as opposed to a mere
putative characterization of the extension of the notion, it is imperative to say
more about how the two conditions are supposed to interact. As things stand,
there is nothing to forestall the impression that two distinct acts of recognition
are implicated in the recognition of analyticity – recognition of truth-value, on
the one hand, and recognition of inessential occurrence, on the other. Worse,
indeed, once the first component— recognition of truth-value— is written into
the definitions in the fashion illustrated, does not the additional clause requiring
inessential occurrence – the distinctive feature of Bolzano’s original definition —
become a mere curlicue?19 What does the requirement that understanding the
target sentence should enable recognition that one or more expressions occur
inessentially within it add to the notion of epistemic analyticity, proposed by
Paul Boghossian over the last couple of decades20, according to which analytic
sentences are those whose truth-value can be recognized purely on the basis of
understanding them?
At first blush, it must be admitted, little or nothing of significance. But the
appearance is arguably deceptive. The recognition that, say, ‘If Bolzano is in
Prague, then Bolzano is in Prague’ is true, and the recognition that it contains
the sentence ‘Bolzano is in Prague’ inessentially, are not two separate feats of
recognition. Rather, someone who understands the conditional sentence can rec-
ognize that it expresses a truth (assuming, of course, that the proper names do
not shift reference between antecedent and consequent) precisely because they
know, in virtue of their understanding of the conditional construction, that pro-
vided the same sentence figures as antecedent and consequent, the conditional
will be true, no matter what sentence that is. One recognizes truth, in such a
case, by way of recognizing inessential occurrence. The point is no peculiarity
18The same complaint applies equally to the recursive definition described in the appendix,
as the reader may easily verify
19In its English sense; apparently in mid-19th century American English it means a caper.
20See [Boghossian(1996)], [Boghossian(1997)], and [Boghossian(2003)])
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of logically analytic truths. The same goes for any other minimally analytic
truth. Consider, say, the proposition that if George is a brother, he is a sibling.
No one whose working vocabulary includes both ‘brother’ and ‘sibling’ needs
to know anything about George in order to know that this proposition is true.
Nor need they recognize that ‘If George is a brother, he is a sibling’ may be
transformed into the logical truth, ‘If George is a male sibling, he is a sibling’.
The ability to recognize the truth of the proposition can be entirely parallel
to that of someone competent to recognize the truth of the proposition that if
Mozart’s socks are yellow, they are coloured – where there can be no question
of recognition proceeding through transformation into a logical truth, because
there is no such transformation. One can recognize the truth of this particu-
lar proposition because one knows, simply in virtue of a competence with the
terms, that no matter what term fills both gaps in the schematic sentence ‘if .
. . is a brother, . . . is a sibling’, the resulting sentence will express a truth.
And so, mutatis mutandis, for the proposition about my socks. And of course,
the same goes for recognition of minimal analytic falsehood. Anyone competent
in the use of sentential negation and conjunction can recognize that ‘Cats are
mammals and cats are not mammals’ must (assuming, of course, no relevant
ambiguity) be false because they know, courtesy of their competence with the
terms, that no matter what declarative sentence, true or false, occupies both
gaps in the schema, ‘. . . and it is not the case that . . . ’, the result will be
false.21
What these examples illustrate, we claim, is indeed the essentially schematic
character of knowledge of analyticity – analytic truth or falsehood – in the basic
(non-inferential) case. This is the insight that Bolzano’s definition – or at least
his emphasis on inessential occurrence – contains. To recognize that the proper
names occur inessentially in ‘If Haydn’s birth preceded Mozart’s, then Mozart’s
followed Haydn’s’ is, in effect, to recognize that, no matter which terms fill the
gaps in the schema ‘If __’s birth preceded . . . ’s, then . . . ’s followed __’s’,
provided the same term fills the first and last, and the same term the second
and third, the resulting statement will, and indeed must, have the same truth-
value as our statement about Haydn and Mozart. The same goes for recog-
nition of inessential occurrence in analytic falsehoods, such as ‘Mozart’s last
symphony was composed before Haydn’s, and Haydn’s last before Beethoven’s,
but Beethoven’s last was composed before Mozart’s’. Recognition of analytic
truth is, or centrally involves, recognition that a certain schema always yields a
truth, on uniform insertion of suitable expressions in its gaps; and so, mutatis
mutandis, for recognition of analytic falsehood.
Care is needed, though, in expressing the point. One does not – at least in
general, if not invariably – first recognize that a sentence contains inessential
occurrences of one or more expressions and then, purely on that basis, move
21No question is begged here against dialetheists. They do not deny that contradictions are
always false. It is just that they think, and presumably claim to know, that some are true
as well. They can avail themselves of this explanation of our recognition of their falsehood.
That leaves the task of explaining putative knowledge of their truth. But that is none of our
business.
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to recognition that the results will be invariantly true (or invariably false) no
matter what expressions replace them. It is not that one recognizes analytic
truth, or falsity, merely by recognizing inessential occurrence. To recognize that
a sentence contains certain expressions inessentially need afford one no more
than the knowledge that its truth-value will not depend on the semantic value
of those expressions; exactly that was the gist of the embedding problem. The
schematic character of analyticity is rather this: that in recognizing that a sen-
tence is analytic, one recognizes that, such are the meanings of some (essentially
occurring) expressions in it, and such is the semantic composition of the sen-
tence as a whole, the sentence will—indeed, must—invariantly express a truth
(or invariantly express a falsehood) no matter what the semantic values of the
remaining (inessentially occurring) expressions it contains. In effect, the pro-
posal is that the root of the notion of analyticity is a property not of truth-apt
sentences in general but of open sentences: a property (the Bolzano property)
which holds in virtue of the syntax and the semantic values of the expressions
they contain and which ensures invariance of truth-value no matter whether
we close them by instantiation or by universal generalization.22 Thus neither
‘If Mozart’s stockings are yellow, they are coloured’ nor ‘Everything yellow is
coloured’ is prior, in point of analyticity, to the other; rather each is posterior
to the schema, ‘If . . . is yellow, it is coloured’. The ground of our recognition
of the analyticity of both the former, it is proposed, is the schematic knowledge
expressed by the latter.23
We thus arrive at the following modification of E-Bolzano 3 :
E-Bolzano 4-Schematic A schema S(η) is analytic iff (i) where S(e) results from
uniform replacement of η throughout S(η) by any expression e of the
type of η, S(e) is always true, or always false, and (ii) that (i) holds
is recognizable by anyone who understands S(η)
E-Bolzano 4.1 A statement A is analytically true iff (a) A is an instance of
an analytic schema whose instances are always true or (b) A is a
universal generalization whose instances are all analytically true or
an existential generalization at least one of whose instances is so
E-Bolzano 4.2 A statement A is analytically false iff (a) A is an instance of
an analytic schema whose instances are always false or (b) A is a
universal generalization one of whose instances is analytically false
or an existential generalization all of whose instances are so
22The idea that for Bolzano, analyticity is a property of propositional forms is suggested in
[Lapointe(2011)] , see p.62-4; but this is not easily squared with what Bolzano himself says
and conflicts with a more orthodox interpretation – see [Künne(2008a)], p.233 ff. We take no
stand on this exegetical issue.
23There is some delicacy with the point, since we are not saying, of course that no one
can recognize analyticity whose language does not contain the resources for the expression of
schemata. The claim is that what is recognized, when someone recognizes the analyticity of
‘If George is a brother, he is a sibling’, or ‘Anything yellow is coloured’, is something which,
had they the appropriate expressive resources, could be formulated by means of a suitable
claim about an open sentence. This should not seem uncomfortable unless one takes it that
a subject’s knowledge is everywhere bounded by the resources they have for its expression.
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It would, we think, be unwise to claim that this modification takes care of all
statements which might plausibly be reckoned analytically true or analytically
false – in effect, that any analytically true statement is either an instance of an
analytic schema, or is obtainable from such schemata by universal or existential
generalization. Indeed, as far as English and other natural languages are con-
cerned, it seems clear that this is not so. An interesting class of exceptions can
be illustrated by examples such as:
Red is a colour
Red is different from green
Temporal precedence is a transitive relation
These examples exploit what we might call higher-order singular terms corre-
sponding to first-level predicates – the nouns ‘red’ and ‘green’ corresponding
to the predicates ‘. . . is red’ and ‘. . . is green’, and the abstract noun phrase
‘temporal precedence’ corresponding to the relational predicate ‘. . . temporally
precedes__’. How such examples are to be handled is a matter of some interest.
It would distract us too much from our central line of argument to pursue this
question here. We discuss it briefly in an appendix.
8.2 Non-epistemic analyticity
It is noteworthy that this proposal immediately provides resources sufficient
to respond to Boghossian’s recently influential critique of what he termed the
“metaphysical conception” of analyticity – the notion encapsulated in the idea
of truth-purely-in-virtue-of-meaning. Boghossian complains that, taken at face
value, the latter notion is incoherent: that no sentence can be true purely in
virtue of its meaning. For any sentence S, if S is true, it will be because for
some proposition p, S expresses p and it is a fact that p. A contribution from
the world, or the facts, is always required even if the contribution is assured.24
It is natural, however, to feel some discomfort with Boghossian’s own response
to his point: the proposal to scrap the metaphysical notion altogether, in favour
of an epistemic one, whereby a sentence ranks as epistemically analytic just in
case an understanding of it provides a sufficient basis for recognition of its truth
(or falsity).25 For bracketing any scepticism whether that there are indeed such
sentences, it could hardly be the last word about them to characterize them in
that – purely epistemic – way. If grasp of a sentence’s meaning puts a subject
in position to recognize its truth, there has to be something about its meaning
in virtue of which that is so.26 The proper conclusion is therefore only that,
24See, for example, [Boghossian(1997)], p.335: “How could the mere fact that S means that
p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be the case that p?”
25cf. [Boghossian(1997)], p.334: “On this [the epistemic] understanding, then, ‘analyticity’
is an overtly epistemological notion: a statement is ‘true by virtue of its meaning’ provided
that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth”.
26Acknowledging that analyticity cannot satisfactorily be conceived purely epistemically
carries no commitment to any particular view about its source, much less a commitment to
a realist or ‘metaphysical’ view. Hence our preference for the colourless term ‘non-epistemic
analyticity’ over Boghossian’s more florid ‘metaphysical analyticity’
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whatever that something is, it cannot be happily captioned as that the meaning
of the sentence is such as to ensure its truth (falsity) with no contribution from
the world.
E-Bolzano-Schematic now supplies a first-pass description of what the ‘some-
thing’ is: it is the property a sentence has when, such are its syntax and the
meanings of the expressions essentially occurring in it, the open sentence result-
ing from the deletion of all inessentially occurring expressions and/or quantifiers
is such as to generate a truth (falsehood) no matter how it is completed. This
account finesses any threat of ‘marginalisation’ of the world in the process of the
determination of the truth-values of analytic sentences, since analyticity is not
now, in the first instance, a property of truth-apt sentences at all. We may of
course extend the scope of the epithet, ‘analytic’, to encompass sentences result-
ing from analytic matrices by substitution or quantification into their argument
places, by means of such further definitions as E-Bolzano 4.1 and E-Bolzano 4.2.
But then the truth-value of an analytic sentence is determined, just as it should
be, both by meaning – the meaning of the open sentence from which it results,
and by the world – in delivering the semantic values, necessary if it is to have
a truth-value at all, of the particular inessentially occurring expressions it con-
tains.27
8.3 Concluding remarks
So, for a theorist who wishes to salvage a metaphysical – better: non-epistemic
– notion of analyticity, that may seem like progress. A caveat is immediately
needed, however, since the characterization just offered over-extends to embrace,
‘If x is composed of water, x is composed of H2O’ as well as ‘If x is yellow, x
is coloured’. And now it is tempting to think that the needed distinction can
only be that, in the latter case, grasp of meaning supplies a complete basis for
recognition of the invariance of truth-value of instances while in the former it
does not. To exclude the unwanted cases, then, capturing just the traditionally
analytic and excluding the necessary a posteriori, it seems that we must still
characterize analyticity epistemically, as a property of the meanings of open
sentences in virtue of which, unsupplemented by other information, it can be
recognized . . . etc. And this, it may well seem, still cannot be the last word;
it cannot be that all there is to say about the property is that it sustains the
relevant epistemic feat; there has to be an explanation of how it is sustained,
of what it is about the matrices in question that enables one who understands
them to recognize that their instances are invariant in truth value.
Accordingly, a properly non-epistemic notion of analyticity must, it seems
to us, find use for the notion of grounding : specifically, for different ways in
which the possession by an open sentence of the Bolzano property may be un-
derwritten. The invited distinction is very much along traditional lines: analytic
sentences are instances, or generalizations, of matrices whose possession of the
27A rather different response to Boghossian’s two-factor argument, as she labels it, is advo-
cated by Gillian Russell (in [Russell(2008)], pp.31-7). For a brief discussion of it, see Appendix
2.
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Bolzano-property is grounded purely in the senses of the expressions they con-
tain, and in their syntax ; other cases, like the water-H2O example, possess the
Bolzano property in virtue of aspects of the essential nature of the semantic
values of the expressions they contain essentially.
So in the end we arrive at a well-visited staging post on the road to vindi-
cation, or repudiation, of the notion of analyticity. Further progress from here,
if possible at all, will require four things: consolidation of the notion of sense,
explication of the notion of ground, an explanation of how the Bolzano-property
can indeed be grounded in sense, and an explanation of how that fact can be
non-inferentially recognized. Misgivings about any of these projects will con-
tinue to fuel scepticism about the notion. But the utterly convincing intellectual
phenomenology of the usual stock of basic examples will continue to fuel resis-
tance to that scepticism. We do not attribute to Bolzano any special insight
into how the deadlock might be broken. But we do think that his ideas contain
a contribution to the proper formulation of the problem that later discussion
lost sight of. That is what we have tried to outline here.
Appendix 1: a recursive solution to the embedding
problem
As observed in 6.2, it is plausible to think that the embedding problem might
be avoided by recasting our epistemologized version of Bolzano’s definition as a
recursive definition. Such a definition must, of course, assume a quite detailed
analysis of the structure of the language to which it is to be applied, taking
into account all the ways in which complex sentences may be constructed out of
simpler ones. Although we know of no convincing reason to doubt that such an
analysis may be given for natural languages such as English, we are certainly
not in a position to provide one. We shall therefore address ourselves to a
much more modest task – describing how a suitable recursive definition may be
constructed for a schematic first-order language.
We assume, then, a first-order language comprising the usual truth-functional
sentential operators together with universal and existential quantifiers binding
individual variables. The language will have a stock of first-level predicates of
varying adicity, along with a stock of singular terms, from which the simplest
sentences of the language may be formed.
Our first task in implementing this suggestion is to circumscribe a suitable
base class of analytic statements. This is less straightforward than might be
anticipated. We cannot take the base class to comprise just atomic or logically
simple statements, since there are complex statements – e.g. the statement that
if my socks are yellow, they are coloured – which we wish to count as analytic but
which do not inherit their analyticity from that of their components. Indeed, it
is far from obvious that there are any logically simple analytic statements. But
if any complex statements are to be included in the base class, we must take
especial care to block inclusion of any which simply re-introduce the embedding
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problem. This can be accomplished by taking the base class to comprise just
those statements which, in addition to satisfying the epistemological condition
previously proposed (see E-Bolzano 1 ), meet the further condition that they
contain no proper part which does so. Clearly this will exclude such monsters
as ‘If p then p and grass is green’, whilst admitting such as ‘If my socks are
yellow, they are coloured’.
However, there is a more serious snag. As we have observed, Bolzano sought
to define what it is for a statement to be analytic, without differentiating be-
tween analytic truth and analytic falsehood; and E-Bolzano 1 follows him in this
regard. This poses no direct obstacle to devising a suitable clause for negation
– clearly ¬A will be analytic iff A is. But with the binary connectives we are
stymied. What clause should we adopt for conjunction, for example? We can’t
say that A∧B is analytic iff A and B both are – for analytic falsehood of either
conjunct alone suffices for that of the conjunction, regardless of the status and
truth-value of the other. But we can’t say that A∧B is analytic iff one of A and
B is – for if one conjunct is analytically true, the conjunction is surely so only
if the other is so as well. It is easily verified that similar difficulties preclude
any satisfactory clauses for the other connectives. The moral is clear. We must,
after all, define analytic truth and falsehood separately.
Accordingly, we give a two part characterization of our base class. We ab-
breviate ‘analytically true’ and ‘analytically false’ to ‘a-true’ and ‘a-false’ re-
spectively. We then define:
A is minimally a-true iff (i) A is true, (ii) A contains at least one
expression inessentially, (iii) the fact that (i) and (ii) are met can be
recognized by anyone who understands A and grasps the semantic
significance of its syntax, and (iv) no proper subformula of A meets
(i),(ii) and (iii)
A is minimally a-false iff (i) A is false, etc., [as for a-true, with ‘false’
replacing ‘true’]
The full definition of analytic truth and analytic falsehood may then be given
as follows:
If A is minimally a-true, A is a-true
If A is minimally a-false, A is a-false
If A is ¬B, A is a-true iff B is a-false, and a-false iff B is a-true
If A is B ∧ C, then A is a-true iff B and C are, and a-false if B
or C is
If A is B ∨ C, then A is a-true if B or C is, and a-false iff both
are
If A is B → C, then A is a-true if ¬B or C is, and a-false iff B
is a-true and C a-false
If A is B ↔ C, then A is a-true iff B → C and C → B are, and
a-false one of them is a-true and the other a-false
If A is ∀vB(v), then A is a-true iff for every t, B(vt ) is, and a-false
iff for some t, B(vt ) is
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If A is ∃vB(v), then A is a-true iff for some t, B(vt ) is, and a-false
iff for every t, B(vt ) is
Otherwise A is neither a-true nor a-false
We have conditionals only, not biconditionals, in the clauses for a-truth for ∨
and ,→, and the clause for a-falsehood for ∧, because statements with these
operators as principal may qualify as minimally analytic; for example: Fa ∨
¬Fa, Fa → Fa, Fa ∧ ¬Fa, as well as more interesting examples which are
not logically analytic, such as ‘a is red → a is coloured’, etc. Instances of
analyticities of the third kind qualify in precisely this way, while their parent
general analyticities qualify by the clauses for the quantifiers.
There is no obvious obstacle to extending a definition along these lines to
richer and expressively more powerful languages, involving higher-order quan-
tification, or modal and perhaps other non-truthfunctional operators. However,
we shall not pursue such extensions here.
Appendix 2: Gillian Russell’s response to the Two-
Factor objection
Boghossian asked ([Boghossian(1997)], p.335): “How could the mere fact that
S means that p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be
the case that p?” The two-factor objection draws on the platitude that when
a sentence is true, its being so is a function both of what the sentence means
and how the world stands in relevant respects. According to Gillian Russell
([Russell(2008)], ch.1), one may coherently respond to it thus: to maintain that
the truth-values of some sentences are fully determined by their meanings is not
to be committed to denying that the world plays a part in determining their
truth-value. Of course, that claim is incoherent, unless there are different kinds
of determination, or senses of ‘determine’, in play. But so, she claims, there are.
To give her strategy some independent plausibility, Russell draws an analogy
with multiplication. When one of the factors, a and b, is 0, their product a× b
is likewise 0, no matter what the value of the other factor. Supposing a = 0, we
might say that the product is wholly determined by a. But this does not oblige
us to deny that it results from multiplying two numbers – after all, without the
other factor, b, there would be no product at all!
So it is, Russell argues, with the determination of a sentence’s truth-value
by the two factors of sentence-meaning and the state of the world. In general,
neither factor wholly determines truth-value. But in the case of analytic sen-
tences, just as with multiplication by 0, one factor – the sentence’s meaning –
by itself wholly determines the sentence’s truth-value. However, this does not
oblige us to deny that the other, worldly, factor plays a part, any more than
we are obliged to deny that the other factor plays a part in multiplication by 0.
It is just that, whatever the other factor is, we get the same result. Still, the
result is the product of two factors, not one.
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To underwrite this response, Russell offers some distinctions. Let f be an
n-ary function, and let xi...xk be some or all of the n-tuple of arguments x1...xn.
Then, first, xi...xk fully determine the value y = f(x1...xn) if, for any n-tuple
of arguments x′1...x′n which coincide with x1...xn over xi...xk, f has y as value,
regardless of the remaining arguments, if any. Second, an argument-place i in
the sequence of argument-places 〈1, ...n〉 partially determines the value-place of
the function, if there are sequences of arguments x1...xn and x′1...x′n which differ
in exactly their ith place, such that f(x1...xi...xn) 6= f(x1...x′i...xn). Finally,
an argument xi redundantly determines the value, y, of the function if f ’s ith
argument-place partially determines its value-place, but there is no sequence of
arguments x′1...x′n which differs from x1...xn in and only in the ith place, and
delivers a value y′ 6= y. These definitions ensure, as of course they are precisely
designed to do, that some of the arguments to a function may fully determine
its value while another of its arguments redundantly determines that value.28
Applying these distinctions to the case in hand, Russell’s proposal is that
just as the binary function, multiplication, maps pairs of numbers to numbers,
so there is a binary function – she labels itM – which maps pairs whose first-
member is a sentence-meaning (or proposition) and whose second is a state of
the world to truth-values (see [Russell(2008)], p.35). In the case of an analytic
sentence S, the truth-value is fully determined by the first factor, S’s meaning
– that is, M’s value for the pair 〈m,w〉, where m is S’s meaning, will be the
truth-value True, no matter what the value of w, the state of the world, may
be. But this does not mean that the state of the world plays no part, for it
does ‘redundantly’ determine the truth-value. Thus, she claims, the two-factor
objection can be answered.
As the discussion in the main body of this paper will have made clear, we
are sympathetic to the spirit of Russell’s proposal to preserve a non-epistemic
notion of analyticity from Boghossian’s objection. But we are doubtful about the
specific tack she takes. The most immediate complaint is that it fails properly
to address the central point of the two factor objection, viz. the claim that the
world not merely invariably plays some part in determining truth-value, but
that when any sentence S is true, what makes it so is the fact that for some
p, S says that p, and – specifically – that it is the case that p. That is, it is
– on the worldly side – not just any old fact, but the particular fact that p
which combines with S’s meaning to deliver the truth-value. In the case of a
multiplication for the form, 0 × a, the a-argument is there simply to make up
the numbers, as it were – since, as remarked, without it or something in its
place, there would be no output value. But in the case of the determination of a
sentence’s truth-value by its meaning and the ‘state of the world’, the latter has
to have a specific character – specifically, as demanded by the meaning of S, it
has to incorporate the fact that p – if the value, True, is to result. So Russell’s
analogy breaks down: the suggestion that states of the world and the non-
28Note that while full and redundant determination are relations on arguments to functions
and their values, partial determination relates argument- and value-places. If partial deter-
mination were defined on arguments instead of argument-places, the definition of redundant
determination would be flatly inconsistent.
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zero factors in multiplications by zero are alike in ‘redundantly determining’
the truth-values of analytic sentences and the product of the multiplications
respectively, masks a crucial difference in the roles they play.
To sharpen the complaint, let’s take the worldly argument of theM-function
to be a specific state of affairs— a state of the world in the sense in which, as we
write, that Obama is the US President, or that there is currently an intensifica-
tion of hostilities in Gaza, are states of the world. Let’s write the curly-bracketed
{Vivaldi died in Venice} to denote the state of the world consisting in Vivaldi’s
dying in Venice, and let {S} in general denote both actually obtaining state
of affairs and merely possible ones (as in our example, Dear Reader – Vivaldi
actually died in Vienna). Let the square-bracketed [Vivaldi died in Venice] de-
note the meaning of “Vivaldi died in Venice”; and let’s writeM([S],{S}) = v to
express that Russell’s M-function has value v for a certain sentence-meaning
and state of affairs as its arguments. Clearly, we should have M([S],{S}) =
True and M([S],{¬S}) = False. But the crucial question is: What should be
the value of our function for an arbitrary pair 〈[S],{T}) where S and T are dif-
ferent sentences. What, for example, isM([Vixens are female],{Haydn invented
the string quartet})? The question poses a dilemma. Either M is defined for
such ill-matched argument pairs, or it is not. Since Haydn’s invention of the
string quartet has no bearing upon the sex of vixens, it is natural to declareM
undefined in this case. But if we say this here, we must say it everywhere except
when first and second arguments are specified using the same sentence or its
negation. And that would be hopeless for Russell’s purpose, since the only ar-
gument pairs for which an analytic sentence A will be defined will be 〈[A], {A}〉
and 〈[A], {¬A}) – or perhaps, slightly less restrictively, for pairs in which the
sentence used to specify the second argument expresses the same proposition
as that used to specify the first. The result is that the desired contrast with
non-analytic sentences is lost – since for exactly the same reason, we should
deny that M is defined for all other argument pairs, such as 〈[Vivaldi died in
Venice],{Haydn was born in Rohrau}〉 in which the state of affairs figuring as
the second argument has no bearing on the truth-value of the proposition which
figures as the first.
If, on the other horn, we insist thatM is defined for such pairs, and claim
that analytic statements are precisely distinguished by the fact that when a
statement A is analytically true, M([A],{B}) has the value True regardless of
the state of affairs serving as its second argument, we thereby surrender all grip
on the idea, encapsulated in the truth-meaning platitude underpinning the two-
factor objection, that even in the case of an analytic statement A, there is a
particular worldly factor that is distinctively relevant to A’s truth, viz. the fact
that A.
It is true that Russell herself seems to have in mind that the worldly factors
which redundantly determine M’s value in the case of analytic sentences are
not states of the world understood in this particularistic way but are something
more like possible worlds in the usual sense, i.e. complete ways for the world to
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be.29 But this makes no difference. The objection does not go away. Rather,
it resurfaces as the requirement that in order for a state of the world, globally
so interpreted, to redundantly determine A’s truth-value as True, it has to
be the case that any possible state of the world – any possible argument for
the second place in the M-function – will incorporate the fact that A. This
requirement has no counterpart in Russell’s prototype of multiplication by zero
– there is, as it were, no zero-specific requirement placed on the second factor
in the multiplication if zero is to be the product, in the way that there is an
A-specific requirement placed on the global worldly states if True is always to
be the value. Moreover there now seems to be an imminent danger that, so
far from making space for something like the traditional idea of truth-purely-
in-virtue-of-meaning, the resulting proposal has the order of determination the
wrong way round. It is down to the nature of zero that the result of multiplying
it by any number is zero. Correspondingly, for a defender of the traditional
idea, it ought to be down to the nature – the meaning – of an analytic truth A
that the valueM gives for the pair consisting of it and any possible state of the
world is True. But on Russell’s proposal, with states of the world now globally
understood, matters seem to run the other – wrong – way around: that is, it is
only because every possible state of the word incorporates the fact that A that
M([A], {. . . }) yields True whatever replaces the dots.30
29Her term ‘state of the world’ for the second argument could, of course, be interpreted
either way. But in giving particular examples (see [Russell(2008)], p.35, fn.4), she uses wα
and wβ , explaining that ‘wα denotes the actual world, and wβ denotes a possible world in
which snow is black’.
30And of course it does not matter, for all that has so far been said, why every possible
state of the world incorporates the fact that A – why there are no non-A worlds. This is in
effect why, in his review of Russell’s book, Boghossian was able justly to complain that her
proposed solution “still leaves us with the problem of distinguishing the merely necessary from
the analytic, because we can equally well say that in the case of a necessarily true sentence,
the truth-value is ‘fully determined’ by the meaning factor alone” (see [Boghossian(2011)],
p.371).
Russell is, of course, fully alive to the danger that her attempt to rescue the metaphysical
notion of analyticity will lead to all necessary truths counting as analytic, and devotes a large
chunk of her book (chapters 2 and 3) to addressing it. We have no space pursue that question
here, beyond observing that the point we have pressed does not depend upon its resolution. As
far as we can see, the complications and revisions she introduces in these chapters are entirely
driven by the need to avert the threatened collapse of analyticity into necessity, and have
no bearing on the two-factor objection, which she appears to take to have been adequately
answered in the preceding chapter. The ensuing complications do not materially affect that
answer. True enough, the binary function M from meaning-world pairs to truth-values is
replaced (see [Russell(2008)], pp.53-7) by a quaternary function M′ whose arguments are a
context of introduction, a context of utterance and a context of evaluation for an expression,
along with what she calls a ‘reference determiner’ associated with it. In case the expression is
a sentence, theM′-function takes quadruples of such arguments to a truth-value. Crucially,
however, the third argument – the context of evaluation – will still be, in effect, just as with
the simplerM-function, a ‘state of the world’. And that is enough to set up the complaint of
the Appendix.
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Appendix 3: Higher-order singular analyticities
As noted in the main text (see p.21), there are candidate analyticities, deploying
what we called higher-order singular terms, which are not – at least not obviously
– obtainable from analytic open sentences by instantiation or quantification,
and which, therefore, pose a challenge to the essentially schematic conception
of analyticity we have presented as a development of Bolzano’s central idea. As
illustrative examples, consider:
Red is a colour
Red is a property
Red is different from green
Crimson is a determinate of red
Temporal precedence is a relation
Temporal precedence is transitive
Addition is a function from numbers to numbers
The natural numbers are closed under addition
These are all, intuitively, as good a range of candidates for epistemic analyticity
as are any sentences. They are all, that is, such that it is tempting to say that
someone who fully understands them is thereby put in position to know that
they express truths. Yet how might they be accommodated by the schematic
conception?
A comprehensive treatment of such examples is beyond the scope of the
present discussion.31 Here we merely outline what in our view (from the stand-
point of a non-sceptic about the notion of analyticity) should be made of them.
The natural first thought, if such cases are to be brought within range of
the schematic approach, is to try to translate them into sentences whose an-
alyticity is straightforwardly treatable in terms of that approach. The use of
abstract nouns to express, in compressed form, what may more compendiously
be expressed as a first-level generalization about concrete entities is common
enough in natural languages. Thus we can say ‘Wisdom is a virtue’ when we
might have expressed ourselves less concisely by saying ‘Anyone who is wise is,
to that extent, virtuous’, or some such. No doubt many of the kind of exam-
ples illustrated might be brought within reach of the schematic conception by
paraphrasing them as generalizations in this kind of way, which would then be
covered by E-Bolzano 4.1 or E-Bolzano 4.2. For instance, it might be proposed
that our first and sixth examples above might be paraphrased as:
Anything which is red is, as such, coloured
and
31The use of higher-order singular terms seems to us to merit systematic study. It is, ar-
guably, no mere an isolated curiosity; on the contrary, a case can be made that the introduction
of such singular terms corresponding to predicates, relational, and functional expressions, of-
ten by more or less explicit kinds of nominalization, plays an indispensable rôle in semantic
and ontological theorizing. But it raises some hard problems. For a discussion of some of
them, see [Hale and Linnebo()].
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If one event precedes another, and the second precedes a third,
then the first precedes the third
We doubt, however, that the reductive paraphrase strategy can give an adequate
account of all the problematic higher-order cases. Even if some of the examples
may seem to admit of fairly natural and plausible transformation into lower-level
generalizations, it is very doubtful that all do so – how, for example, should
we paraphrase ‘Red is a property’, or ‘Addition is a function from numbers
to numbers’. But more importantly, what exactly is paraphrase supposed to
accomplish? The initial explanandum, remember, is the apparent epistemic
analyticity of the kind of example illustrated. So is the idea that the epistemic
route by which the (putative) analyticity of such examples is recognized goes
through the suggested paraphrase? That seems to us quite implausible, even in
the case of the examples like ‘Red is a colour’, where, on the contrary, it seems
that once a speaker has acquired the use of the nouns ‘red’ and ‘colour’, she
can directly recognize the truth of ‘Red is a colour’, without the need for any
detour through the proposed paraphrase.
The right approach, we believe, is to take the singularity of the examples
seriously. Rather than essay to see them as some kind of idiomatic variants
on lower-level generalisations, we should attempt to account for their distinc-
tive epistemic status in a way that connects directly with their overt syntactic
structure. ‘Red is a colour’ says something about the kind of property that
the particular property, red, is; ‘Temporal precedence is transitive’ likewise says
something about the character of the relation of temporal precedence, and so
on. These are higher-order singular necessary truths, and a satisfactory account
of their distinctive epistemic status should acknowledge them as such.
Singular necessary truths in general are not a rare bird. Since Naming and
Necessity, philosophers have been very mindful of the kind of singular necessities
typified by ‘Water is H2O, ‘Heat is molecular motion’, ‘Saul Kripke is the son
of Dorothy and Myer’, and so on. These are necessities of essence, broadly
construed: propositions whose truth is determined by the essential nature of the
referents of their subject terms. We suggest it is no different with the examples
in the list above. ‘Red is a colour’ is true in virtue of the essential nature of the
property, red; ‘Temporal precedence is transitive’ is true in virtue of the essential
nature of the relation of temporal precedence. Yet the Kripkean examples are
of necessities known a posteriori, while the higher-order singular statements
on our list present, rather, as knowable a priori – hence their appearance as,
intuitively, epistemically analytic. How then can there be any close comparison
between the two kinds of case?
Well, the comparison can be saved while acknowledging the epistemic con-
trast, provided that the relevant essences, in the case of the higher-order sin-
gular statements, and unlike the Kripkean cases, are themselves knowable a
priori: more specifically, provided that those aspects of the nature of the as-
sociated properties in virtue of which one who understands statements of the
relevant kind incorporating higher-order singular terms is empowered to recog-
nise them as true, are given with an understanding of the relevant singular terms.
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An account pursuing that thought may draw on what is standardly called an
abundant conception of properties and relations.32 According to the abundant
conception, it suffices for a predicate to express, or stand for, a property or
relation that it be associated with a well-determined satisfaction condition, and
the nature of the property or relation involved is, moreover, fully manifest in
that satisfaction-condition. Thus the essence or nature of an abundant prop-
erty or abundant relation does not lie beneath the surface, as it were, awaiting
discovery by painstaking scientific investigation, but is open to view, and di-
rectly available to anyone who grasps the relevant satisfaction condition (see
[Hale(2013)], §11.2).
In such cases, there is an a priori route to knowledge of essence, and this
extends to support knowledge a priori of the higher-order analyticities illustrated
by our list. A priori recognition that red is a colour rests, not on registering a
relation of inclusion between the senses of the nouns ‘red’ and ‘colour’, still less
on appreciating that it is equivalent to some analytic generalisation featuring
the predicates, "red" and "coloured", but on knowing, as competence in its use
requires, that the noun ‘red’ stands for the property attributed by the use of
the corresponding adjective – the property whose essence is fully encapsulated
in the satisfaction condition associated with the predicate ‘. . . is red’, along with
knowledge of a parallel fact about what the noun ‘colour’ stands for.
If this suggestion is broadly correct, we should recognise that we have to
deal with two quite different kinds of analyticity. There is the phenomenon of
analytic schematic generality, discerned by Bolzano, on which the main body
of our discussion has concentrated; and there is a phenomenon of abundant
property essence, illustrated by the present examples. Still, in view of the se-
mantic relationship between (n-place) predicates and the corresponding higher-
order terms – which of course needs a proper account – and supposing that an
abundant conception of the referents of the latter, and the transparency that
enjoins, is accepted, it remains that both phenomena are rooted au fond in the
satisfaction-conditions of predicates, and thus in meaning.
Which is as it ought to be.33
32The terminology of abundant and sparse properties originates in [Lewis(1986)]. The
general distinction is in [Armstrong(1979)]. See also [Bealer(1982)], [Swoyer(1996)], and
[Shaffer(2004)]. For a useful overview, see [Mellor and Oliver(1997)]. Our own discussions
include [Hale and Wright(2009)], pp.197-9, 207-9, [Hale(2013)], §§1.12, 7.2, and [Hale(2010)],
§§3,9.
33We are grateful to Beau Mount and Filippo Ferrari for pressing the need for a treatment
of the higher-order singular cases in discussion of these issues at the 2014 Northern Institute
of Philosophy Summer School on the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. A similar point
was urged by Manual Garcia-Carpintero in discussion at a workshop on analyticity in Lisbon.
We are grateful, too, to Mark Textor for very helpful advice on the interpretation of Bolzano’s
work, to Keith Hossack for useful discussion of an earlier version, and to Jared Warren, and
especially to Wolfgang Künne, for detailed written comments on our penultimate draft.
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